Insurance by Evans, Linwood S., Jr.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 19 
Issue 4 Survey of South Carolina Law 1967 Article 8 
1967 
Insurance 
Linwood S. Evans Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Evans, Linwood S. Jr. (1967) "Insurance," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 19 : Iss. 4 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss4/8 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 




During the preceding survey period the substantive law of
insurance has been relatively prolific as evidenced by the num-
ber of decisions rendered by the courts of this jurisdiction-
both state and federal. As could be expected, however, there are
few instances in which more than one of the decisions is related
to the same particular facet of the law as would facilitate the
discussion thereof on a topic rather than an individual case
basis. Accordingly, most of the decisions will be discussed sepa-
rately with grouping by subject matter attempted wherever
possible.
II. APPLICATIOI FOR INSURANCE
Perhaps the most appropriate jumping off place in this area
is the application for a policy of insurance and related problems.
The case of Smiley v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance
Company' involved an application which the defendant-insurer
alleged contained fraudulent misrepresentations that rendered
the life insurance policy of the plaintiff's deceased null and void.
Because it is virtually impossible to appreciate or to fully under-
stand the decision without a full discussion of the facts, they are
presented in such detail as the author deems essential to their
comprehension.
In February 1964 the insured, William A. Smiley, became ill
and contacted his family physician who referred him to another
doctor for a possible tonsillectomy. This second doctor diagnosed
Smiley's illness as leukemia and referred him to the South Caro-
lina Medical College Hospital in Charleston where this diag-
nosis was confirmed. Smiley was confined for six days during
which time he improved considerably and, upon being released,
returned to full time employment. He remained an out-patient,
returning to the hospital at intervals of six to eight weeks, dur-
ing which time he continued to take medicine. Since the insured
was only twenty years old at this time, his family did not reveal
the nature of his illness to him, and except for the periodic visits
to the Medical College Hospital and one occasion when he was
treated for a sore throat, Smiley saw no physician again until
May 25, 1965.
1. 154 S.E2d 834 (S.C. 1966).
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On April 20, 1965, Smiley was solicited by an agent of the
defendant who offered him up to 15,000 dollars life insurance
coverage without a medical examination. Smiley agreed to take
out a 1,000 dollar policy at that time, and the policy was issued
on April 28, 1965. Subsequently Smiley's condition deteriorated,
and he was readmitted to the Medical College Hospital on May
25, 1965, where he remained until June 2, 1965. Following this
discharge he returned to normal activities but had to be read-
mitted on July 17, 1965. On July 27, 1965, Smiley died of
leukemia.
In an action by Smiley's wife, as named beneficiary, to recover
the proceeds of the policy, the insurance company defended on
the grounds that the policy contained false and fraudulent
representations, to wit:
6. Have you ever been under care or treatment in any hos-
pital or similar institution?
A. No
7. Have you within the past ten years had any mental or
bodily disease or infirmity or within that time consulted a
physician?
A. No
8. Do you regularly take medication? If so, state below the
name of drug and condition requiring it.
A. No
9. Are you now in good health?
A. Yes2
In support of its motions, the defendant argued: (1) even if
Smiley was unaware of his condition, he withheld pertinent
information with respect to his medical treatment and (2) Mrs.
Smiley, who was present during a portion of the interview of
April 20, 1965, should have revealed the nature of her husband's
illness. With respect to this latter contention the defendant
relied upon the case of Gamble v. Metropolitan Life Thsrance
7ornpany3 in which the insurer's liability on a life insurance
policy was denied by the court on a finding that the insured's
husband, in applying for the policy on her life, had withheld
information of the insured's terminal illness.
2. Id. at 837.
3. 92 S.C. 451, 75 S.E. 788 (1911).
[Vol. 19
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In rejecting the defendant's argument the court reiterated the
well settled proposition4 that
[I]n order to void a policy of insurance on the ground that
the fraudulent misrepresentations were made in the procur-
ing of such policy, the burden of proof rests upon the in-
surer to show, by clear and convincing evidence, not only
that the statements complained of were untrue, but in addi-
tion thereto that their falsity was known to the applicant,
that they were material to the risk, were relied on by the
insurer, and that they were made with intent to deceive
and defraud the company.5
Having adopted this position, the court proceeded to resolve
several factual issues: (1) Smiley was obviously unaware of his
physical condition; (2) with regard to question 8. above, the
insured had been informed that the pills he was taking were
vitamins, and this was admitted to the agent; (3) there was evi-
dence that Smiley had informed the defendant's agent of his
prior hospitalization, and this evidence must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff; and (4) there was evidence
that the original interview of April 20th had been recorded on
scratch paper, that the insured had admitted prior hospitaliza-
tion during the interview, that his responses had been altered
on the final form which the insured gave only a cursory exami-
nation before signing.
In considering Mrs. Smiley's failure to disclose the nature of
Smiley's illness to the agent, the court determined that it was
not she who was being interviewed, that she was present during
only a portion of the interview, and that it was only logical that
she not reveal this information to a total stranger in front of
her husband, the very one from whom she was concealing it,
especially in view of the fact that she thought that subsequent
medical examination would reveal the illness if it still existed.
In this regard the court distinguished the Gamble decision on
the grounds that there the insured's husband had requested that
the policy be issued, had participated in the interview, had paid
the premiums and had knowingly rendered false information.
The court focused on this active participation, stating, "[Ilt was
4. Hood v. Security Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 71, 145 S.E2d 526 (1965); Small v.
Coastal States Life Ins. Co., 241 S.C. 344, 128 S.E.2d 175 (1962) ; Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Bates, 213 S.C. 269, 49 S.E2d 201 (1948).
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reasonable to infer that the husband was the agent of his wife
in the transaction, and that, therefore, his knowledge about her
condition should be imputed to her."6 In the instant case there
was nothing in the record to indicate that Mrs. Smiley had any
knowledge that the policy had ever been issued or that she had
been named the beneficiary thereof. Accordingly, the court con-
cluded, "The lower court, under these circumstances, would not
have been warranted in holding, as a matter of law, that the
respondent was derelict in her duty or guilty of fraud which
would preclude her recovery."7
It should be noted that in Gamble the husband of the insured
was aware of his wife's terminal disease at the time he signed
the application, thereby certifying the contents as true. The
court there, however, stated that
As between the plaintiff and the insurance company, the law
imposed upon him the duty of informing his wife of her
condition to the end that she should not impose upon the
insurance company in his behalf, and it will not allow him
to say, in enforcing his claim, that he did not perform his
duty.
8
It appears that the court in Gamble focused more on this duty
in imputing the husband's knowledge to his wife than it did in
the instant case. This knowledge-duty criterion was, at least
inferentially, subordinated to the seemingly distinct and some-
what more liberal "active participation" standard employed to
sustain recovery in iSmiley.
The case of Hinds v. United Insurance Company of America9
represents a recent development in South Carolina with regard
to the insurer's failure, within a reasonable time, to act upon an
application for an insurance policy. This action was instituted
by the plaintiff, John M. Hinds, to recover damages from the
defendant allegedly occasioned by United's negligence in hand-
ling his applications. The complaint alleged that United had
issued a policy of health and accident insurance to Hinds about
January of 1961 which was later replaced by a more compre-
hensive policy issued about December 1, 1961. Hinds subse-
quently learned that this second policy was not actually in
6. Id. at 838.
7. Id. at 839.
8. Gamble v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 92 S.C. 454, 75 S.E. 789 (1911).
9. 248 S.C. 285, 149 S.E.2d 771 (1966).
[Vol. 19
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accordance with his understanding thereof at the time he applied
for it; and, after making two or three quarterly payments, he
allowed this second policy to lapse some time in 1962. He was
approached by one of United's agents in late 1962 or early 1963
and advised that he could reinstate the first policy provided
he did so before March 15, 1963-it being alleged that the agent
knew or 'should have known that such statement was not true.
On February 19, 1963, Hinds remitted his check to the defendant
in paym6nt of the first quarterly premium due on the policy to
be reinstated. He assumed that this application had been acted
upon until July 23, 1963, at which time he was informed by
another of United's agents that the time for reinstatement had
expired prior to the application on February 19, 1963. Immedi-
ately upon receipt of this information Hinds applied for a new
policy, giving the agent an additional amount which, together
with the check of February 19, 1963, constituted the quarterly
premium due on this policy. This new policy was not issued
until September 25, 1963, and contained a provision excluding
coverage for a heart attack occurring within six months after
the, is uance thereof. On March 20, 1964, just five days before
the new policy would have been in effect for the requisite six
months, Hinds suffered a heart attack. It was further alleged
that Hinds would have had coverage at the time of his heart
attack but for the negligent, reckless, wilful and wanton acts on
the part of the defendant and its agents in misleading him into
believing that the original policy could be reinstated and that it
had been reinstated, and in failing to accept or reject his appli-
cation for reinstatement, as well as his application of July 23,
1963,',within a reasonable time. Both actual and punitive dam-
ages were demanded.
The defendant demurred, asserting that the facts alleged did
not give rise to a cause of action ex delicto. In this regard the
court reviewed the conflicting decisions from other jurisdictions,
concluding that, considering the allegations in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, United had breached "the duty owed
by an insurer and its agents to an applicant to avoid representa-
tions which would mislead the applicant to his detriment, and
at the same time handle the application with care and without
unreasonable delay."' 0 Accordingly, the complaint was deemed
to have contained a valid cause of action ex delicto.
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To the defendant's argument that Hinds had either waived or
become estopped to assert his rights by virtue of having accepted
the policy, the court replied,
However negligent, reckless willful or wanton [United] may
have been, such conduct would not give rise to a cause of
action in the absence of damage to [Hinds]. When [Hinds]
accepted the new policy, he had then sustained no damage
and had no cause of action, so that there was at that time no
known enforceable right which he could waive. 1
United's further contention that the complaint was demurrable
as indicating on its face Hinds' contributory negligence was
likewise rejected:
There is ample authority for the proposition that a com-
plaint based upon negligence is demurrable if it state facts
from which plaintiff's contributory negligence must be in-
ferred. On the other hand, if the facts stated do not con-
clusively show contributory negligence, or may support an
inference to the contrary, then the question of contributory
negligence becomes a jury question.... Even assuming that
the complaint shows [Hinds] to be contributorily negligent,
simple contributory negligence on his part would not defeat
a recovery, if the conduct of [United] was willful and
wanton as alleged by [Hinds].1
2
United's final contention was that any recovery by the plain-
tiff should be limited to actual damages and in no event could
it be held liable for punitive damages. In ruling on this point
the court acknowledged the absence of a similar local situation
in which punitive damages were sought, but it concluded that
there was
no sound reason for holding that the tort alleged in the
complaint in this action should be governed by a rule dif-
ferent from that applicable in other tort actions. It is, of
course, elementary that a tort committed in a willful and
wanton manner entitles a complainant in this jurisdiction to
exemplary or punitive damages.
13
Justice Legge, however, refused to concur with the majority
on this point, apparently viewing the action as one ex contractu
11. Id. at 292, 149 S.E2d at 775.
12. Id. at 292-93, 149 S.E2d at 775-76.
13. Id. at 293, 149 S.E2d at 776.
[Vol. 19
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for which punitive damages cannot be supported by an allega-
tion of gross negligence.
14
Although, as noted by the court, there appear to be no prior
cases of this nature in which the plaintiff sought to recover
damages for the negligent delay in acting upon an application
for insurance, there was at least one relatively recent decision
involving a similar factual situation in which the insurance com-
pany was found to have been estopped to deny that there was a
contract of insurance.' 5 It would be impossible to generalize as to
which theory would provide the best approach when faced with a
similar factual situation, for the needs of the individual plaintiff
should govern in every instance.16 The advantage of the princi-
ple recognized in Hinds, however, is obvious to one familiar with
the law of damages in this area. Not only were actual damages
or policy benefits recoverable, but in addition, the court acknowl-
edged the propriety of the prayer for punitive damages which
would never be appropriate in an action to recover for the
alleged breach of a previously executed contract 1
III. EsToppm To DENY COVERAGE
The case of Prefemed Risk Mutual Insurance Company v.
Thomas"' likewise involved a controversy centering around the
application for an insurance policy. In this situation the court
considered the information divulged by the applicant in deter-
mining whether the insurer would be allowed to assert an ex-
14. See the textual discussion of Felder v. Great Anmerican It. Co., infra
p. 584.
15. Moore v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 222 S.C. 492, 73 S.E.2d 688
(1952).
16. The two choices are: (1) sue in an action ex contractu, as in Moore,
alleging that the defendant insurance company is estopped by its unreasonable
delay to deny the existence of the contract; or (2) commence an action ex
delicto, as in the instant case, asserting the insurer's wilful and wanton negli-
gence in failing to act upon the application within a reasonable time. One might
wonder why an action ex contractu should ever be maintained when one ex
delicto is available by which punitive damages may be recovered; but there
are situations in which the plaintiff would be benefitted by the existence of an
actual contract. An example would be where the injury occurred after a time
sufficient for processing the application but before passage of enough time for
the applicant to have secured coverage from a second insurance company. In
other words, the tort-plaintiff must be able to show that if the insurer had
acted within a reasonable time, even in refusing the application, he could have
procured insurance from some other source as would have provided him pro-
tection at the time in question.
17. See the textual discussion of Felder v. Great American Ins. Co., infra
p. 584.
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clusionary provision inconsistent with this information. Robert
Green applied to Preferred through its agent, Reeves, for a
policy of liability insurance covering his 1958 Dodge panel
truck. Green informed Reeves that the truck was to be driven
some sixty miles to and from work six days a week carrying an
average of five passengers per trip on a share the expense basis.
All of this information, with the exception of the average num-
ber of passengers, was also included in the written application
for insurance submitted by Green to the insurer. A policy was
issued on July 't, 1964, effective retroactively to June 25, 1964,
containing a clause specifically excluding any claim arising from
the use of the vehicle for public conveyance or livery.
On July 4, 1964, while being operated by one Leola Lawrence,
the truck was involved in an accident which resulted in injuries
to several of the passengers. These individuals commenced
actions against Green to recover for their injuries. The insurer
instituted this proceeding for a declaratory judgment absolving
it of any liability for such judgments as might be rendered
against Green. Preferred asserted that the above stated clause
should be deemed an absolute bar to liability on its part. The
injured parties contended, on the other hand, that the insurer
should be estopped from asserting and be deemed to have waived
this defense by reason of its issuance of the policy in question
with full knowledge of the use to which the insured intended
to put the covered vehicle. The district court resolved this issue
in favor of the insured in ruling that
It has frequently been held in this state that if an insurance
agent, at the inception of the contract, has knowledge of a
fact constituting a forfeiture, such knowledge is imputed to
the company, and the issuance of the policy as a valid policy
estops the company from asserting the forfeiture.1 9
It is from this decision that the insurer appealed, arguing in
part that the exclusionary clause was not a ground of forfeiture
which could be waived in this manner but rather a limitation
on the scope of the policy which neither waiver nor estoppel
could be employed to broaden. In recognizing a substantive
though somewhat nebulous distinction between the two, the
court in the instant case concluded that
19. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 204, 208 (D.S.C.
1966), quoting from McCarty v. Piedmont Mut. Ins. Co., 81 S.C. 152, 62 S.E.
1 (1907) ; Slawson v. Equitable Fire Ins. Co., 82 S.C. 51, 62 S.E. 782 (1907).
[Vol. 19
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[I]nsured's failure to perform a condition that would bring
or keep the policy in force, such as paying periodic pre-
minums as they fall due, would work a forfeiture while a
condition going to the scope of coverage would not affect
the operation of the policy except as to risks arising from
specified activities.... The only legal effect of the clause
in question, if valid and enforceable, would be to exclude
from coverage liability for injuries or damage which might
arise while the truck was being used for public .. . con-
veyance.2o
Having reached this decision, however, the court went on to
invoke a local exception 2 ' to the general principle that the scope
of the risk cannot be extended by estoppel.22 The facts presented
in this situation were then balanced against the elements requi-
site to a proper invocation of this exception.m2 These facts can
best be appreciated through enumeration: (1) no opportunity
on the part of the insured to examine the policy prior to the
accident; (2) no evidence to indicate knowledge on the part of
the insured that the exclusionary clause had been included in
the policy; (3) reliance by the insured on Preferred's agent's
representations that the policy would meet his needs; (4) knowl-
edge on the part of the insurer that the vehicle in question would
be used to carry passengers six times a week on a share the
expense basis; (5) acceptance of the premium payment with the
cumulative knowledge of agent Reeves and Preferred as to
Green's intended use of the vehicle; and (6) obvious prejudice
to Green. Although no real insight is given as to which of these
factors was most instrumental in facilitating the invocation of
the exception, it would be safe to assume that not all were essen-
tial to this decision.
24
20. 372 F.2d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 1967).
21. See Pitts v. New York Life Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 545, 148 S.E.2d 369
(1966) ; Johnson v. Wabash Life Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 95, 135 S.E.2d 620 (1964) ;
Moore v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 222 S.C. 492, 73 S.E.2d 688 (1952) ;
Ellis v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 187 S.C. 162, 197 S.E. 510 (1938).
22. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 227, 230 (4th Cir.
1967).
23. The essential elements of estoppel as set out in the South Carolina de-
cisions are: "(1) ignorance of the party involdng it of the truth as to the facts
in question; (2) representations or conduct of the party estopped which mis-
lead; (3) reliance upon such representations or conduct; and (4) prejudicial
change of position as the result of such reliance." Pitts v. New York Life Ins.
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Another aspect of this case concerned the question of the ad-
missibility of Reeves' testimony relative to negotiations with
Green prior to the policy being submitted. In ruling in favor of
admissibility the court relied upon what it determined to be an
accepted proposition of law as supported by South Carolina
decisions.2 5
IV. BREACH OF INSURANCE CONTRACT
After having executed a note and mortgage on her home in the
amount of 1,500 dollars to Home Federal Savings and Loan,
Justine Felder, together with her husband, purchased a health
and accident policy from the Great American Insurance Com-
pany through Home Federal as the soliciting agent. The amount
of the policy was the same as that of the note with the monthly
benefits approximating the monthly mortgage installments.
When Mr. Felder became disabled in December 1962, a claim
blank was obtained by the plaintiff from Home Federal and
submitted to the insurer. This claim was paid as were those filed
in the two succeeding months. Upon their request for a fourth
claim blank, however, the Felders were informed that the in-
surer was not going to make any further payments and that it
would be useless to submit any additional claims. Mr. Felder's
disability continued for some time, and in March of 1964 fore-
closure was threatened as result of Mrs. Felder's failure to meet
the mortgage payments. Rather than submit to the foreclosure
proceedings, however, the Felders sold their home and lot for
one half of its value so as to satisfy the mortgage.
In their action against the defendant insurance company,2 6 the
plaintiffs demanded, in addition to damages for anxiety and
anguish, compensation for damaged credit and reputation. The
complaint purported to contain three separate causes of action,
each independent in the alternative; and this suit was commenced
to determine the sufficiency of each allegation so as to ascertain
whether any or all of them constituted a valid cause of action.
The first of these demands was based on the allegedly fraudu-
lent representation by Home Federal that the filing of any fur-
ther claims would be to no avail as no subsequent payments
would be forthcoming. The insurer was alleged to have had
25. Bost v. Bankers Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 242 S.C. 274, 130 S.E.2d 907
1963); Polatty v. Woodmen 0. W. Ins. Soc'y, 191 S.C. 79, 3 S.E.2d 681
1939) ; Norris v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 57 S.C. 358, 35 S.E. 572 (1900).
26. Felder v. Great American Ins. Co., 260 F. Supp. 575 (D.S.C. 1966).
10
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knowledge of the falsity of this statement. The complaint also
alleged that the plaintiffs were ignorant of this falsehood and
had a right to rely on the statement. There was a further asser-
tion that the submission of a claim blank was a condition prece-
dent to payment and that the agent, Home Federal, knew that
the failure to submit the blank would preclude payment of the
policy benefits. The court viewed this allegation as establishing
the basis for a claim intended to recover for fraud and deceit ;27
and in this connection, it reiterated the nine elements generally
recognized as part and parcel of actionable fraud,28 the absence
of any one of which is fatal to the suit.29 Recognizing that
"[o]rdinarily the mere failure of an insurer or contractor to pay
sums of money under the contract does not support actions for
fraud and deceit or breach of contract accompanied by a fraudu-
lent act,"3 0 the court observed that the allegations went further
by charging that the insurer, through its agent, falsely repre-
sented that no more payments would be made. The charge of
falsity was substantiated by the fact that a subsequent lump-sum
payment was actually made. Accordingly, the allegations were
deemed sufficient to constitute a valid cause of action for fraud
and deceit.
The second cause of action was for breach of contract accom-
panied by a fraudulent act. The alleged breach was not for the
failure to pay at all but rather for the failure to pay on time,
the defendant being aware that time was of the essence in this
particular situation. In noting the plaintiff's apparent desire
to include sufficient allegations upon which to base a claim for
punitive damages (i.e., a fraudulent act accompanying the
breach) the court recognized the validity of this second demand.
In so ruling it relied primarily upon the factors considered with
respect to the first cause of action discussed above.
The third prayer was for damages arising out of the defend-
ant's negligent, wilful, reckless and wanton breach of duty
27. Id. at 577.
28. (1) A representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speak-
er's knowledge of its falsity; (5) his intent that it should be acted upon by the
person; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) his reliance on its truth;
(8) his right to rely thereon; and (9) and his consequent and proximate
injury.
29. E.g., Jones v. Cooper, 234 S.C. 477, 109 S.E2d 43 (1959); Tallevast v.
Herzog, 225 S.C. 563, 83 S.E2d 204 (1954) ; Weatherford v. Home Fin. Co.,
225 S.C. 313, 82 S.E2d 196 (1954); Flowers v. Price, 190 S.C. 392, 3 S.E.2d
38 (1939). See also Parks v. Morris Homes Corp., 245 S.C. 461, 141 S.E.2d
129 (1965).
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allegedly owed to the plaintiff, said conduct resulting in the loss
of the plaintiff's home. In unequivocally denying the suffi-
ciency of this allegation the court observed, "In the case of an
alleged tort arising out of contract there must exist a duty aris-
ing out of the relation created by the contract which exists apart
from the contract."3' In this respect an earlier South Carolina
decision was relied on for the proposition that
Ordinarily, where there is no duty except such as the con-
tract creates, the plaintiff's remedy is for breach of con-
tract, but when the breach of duty allegedly arises out of a
liability independently of the personal obligation under-
taken by the contract, it is a tort.82
Having found no duty co-existing and correlative with the con-
tract imposed on the insurer, the breach of which would give
rise to this action, the court concluded that "no set of facts could
be proven under these allegations which would support a cause
of action for negligence. The action is ex contractu."83
The reference to a duty created by and correlative with a con-
tract but existing independently of the contractual relationship
may appear at first blush somewhat incongruous. When viewed
in perspective, however, such a duty may be easily recognized
and understood. An excellent illustration may be found in the
case of Meddin v. Southern Raiway3 4 involving a contract with
a common carrier. It is readily apparent that the carrier would
owe no duty to an individual with whom it had never had any
dealings; but once it agreed to transport the plaintiff's property,
it became bound by the terms of the contract as well as such
rules and regulations as established by the Public Service Com-
mission relative to the property. Accordingly, the defendant
could be held liable in tort for damage to the property occasioned
by its failure to adhere to the regulations, whereas any allega-
tion of negligence would be improper if the action were main-
tained under the contract itself in the absence of such regulation.
This essential distinction was also recognized by the Supreme
Court in the case of Atlantic & Pacifl Railway v. Laird.5
31. Id. at 578.
32. Dixon v. Texas Co., 222 S.C. 385, 389, 72 S.E2d 897, 899 (1952).
33. 260 F. Supp. at 579.
34. 218 S.C. 155, 62 S.E.2d 109 (1950).
35. 164 U.S. 393 (1896).
[Vol., 19
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In situations in which the distinction is not so easily recog-
nized the controversy must be resolved in favor of an action ex
contractu."8
The plaintiff in Dawkins v. National Liberty Life Insurance
Company37 filed an action in federal court to recover an amount
of less than 1,000 dollars allegedly due him on a policy of insur-
ance issued by the defendant, and 500,000 dollars punitive dam-
ages for the alleged wilful and fraudulent conversion of the
1,000 dollars by the defendant. The defendant moved to strike
from the complaint all references to punitive damages, thereby
reducing the amount demanded to less than the requisite juris-
dictional amount. The defendant asserted that in South Carolina
no punitive damages are recoverable for a mere refusal to pay a
sum of money.
The court analyzed the requisite elements of conversion and
concluded inferentially that the plaintiff had never established
sufficient claim to the disputed sum to give rise to an independ-
ent action for conversion. This holding was apparently viewed
by the court as being dictated by the South Carolina decision of
Holland v. Spartanburg-Herald-Journa& Company38 in which
punitive damages were deemed improper in an action to recover
wages allegedly due on an employment contract. The court in
Dawklins therefore determined that to allow such damages
"would be equivalent to saying that every unpaid debt carries
with it the implication of fraud on the part of the debtor; that
the debtor has converted to his own use the money of another or
that he has misappropriated that which was always his own."39
The complaint in this action represents an obvious attempt on
the part of the plaintiff's attorney to circumvent the general
prohibition against punitive damages in an action arising out of
a contract, as was discussed above in Felder. The court, seem-
ingly cognizant of this attempt, plugged this prospective loop-
hole, so as to maintain the prohibition against recovery of puni-
tive damages in these situations. Had this deceptively innocent
scheme been successful, the insurance industry would have stood
to suffer considerably at the hands of resourceful plaintiffs'
attorneys.
36. Dixon v. Texas Co., 222 S.C. 385, 72 S.E2d 897 (1952). See, e.g., Tim-
mons v. Williams Wood Products Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1931);
V. P. Randolph & Co. v. Walker, 78 S.C. 157, 59 S.E. 856 (1907).
37. 263 F. Supp. 119 (D.S.C. 1967).
38. 116 S.C. 454, 165 S.E. 203 (1932).




Published by Scholar Commons, 1967
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[
The South Carolina Supreme Court was faced, in the case of
Warren v. Allstate Insurance Company,40 with the question of
whether the unwarranted cancellation of a certificate of insur-
ance constituted a breach of the contract of insurance. The
plaintiff, Billy B. Warren, prior to regaining his previously
suspended driver's license, was issued a policy of automobile
liability insurance by Allstate. Allstate, in turn, filed the requi-
site certificate of insurance41 with the South Carolina Highway
Department, thereby acknowledging its contract with the plain-
tiff and enabling him to regain his license. This certificate was
subsequently and admittedly without justification cancelled by
the defendant, resulting in the automatic suspension of Warren's
license.42 As a result of this conduct on the part of the insurer,
Warren was unable to renew his driver's license for a period of
six months.
In an action by Warren to recover actual and punitive dam-
ages for the wrongful cancellation, the defendant demurred on
the theory that: (1) the plaintiff's remedy was an administra-
tive hearing by the Highway Department with judicial review
if necessary; and (2) the plaintiff was attempting to recover
damages resulting from the defendant's supplying the Depart-
ment with allegedly false information, which is in effect an
action for damages in a civil suit for perjury committed in a
quasi-judicial hearing, and that such actions are forbidden by
public policy. To be more precise, Allstate contended that it
merely supplied the bullets with which the Highway Depart-
40. 249 S.C. 89, 152 S.E.2d 727 (1967).
41. S.C. CODE Aux. § 46-744 (1962).
Whenever the Department, under any law of this State, suspends or
revokes the license of any person upon receiving a record of conviction or
forfeiture of bail and in all cases where the Department suspends or
revokes the driver's license of any person under lawful authority pos-
sessed by the Department, the Department shall also suspend the regis-
tration for all motor vehicles registered in the name of that person, except
that it shall not suspend the registration, unless otherwise required by
law, if that person has previously given or shall immediately give and
thereafter maintain proof of financial responsibility with respect to all
motor vehicles registered by him. The license and registration shall re-
main suspended or revoked and shall not at any time thereafter be
renewed nor shall any license be thereafter issued to that person nor
shall any motor vehicle be thereafter registered in the name of that person
until permitted under the motor vehicle laws of this State and not then
until he shall give and thereafter maintain proof of financial responsi-
bility (emphasis added).
In this regard the court referred to section 46-745. This is presumed to have
been an oversight, however, as that section deals with financial responsibility
of non-residents.
42. S.C. CODE Aux. § 46-750.5 (1962).
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ment loaded the gun it used in "grounding" Warren, that All-
state had nothing to do with the actual revocation of Warren's
license. Our court rejected this line of argument, however, not-
ing that the automatic revocation was by statute effective imme-
diately upon receipt by the Department of the cancellation
notice. Thus it said, in effect, that Allstate had provided the
ammunition for a weapon which fires automatically upon being
loaded.
The Department is not empowered under the provisions of
the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act to determine
the legality of the cancellation of a certificate of insurance,
but, on the contrary, the Department is directed by Section
46-750.5 to cancel a certificate of insurance "upon request.
'43
In adopting this position the court also rejected the quasi-
judicial hearing theory proposed by Allstate and apparently
concluded that the action was one for the wrongful breach of a
contract of insurance. Thus, the complaint was sustained on
that premise with the loss of driving privileges being viewed as
a proper element of damages.
V. UN-nMsuR MOTORuST STATUTE
The court, in deciding United States Fidelity & Guarantee
Co. v. Security Fire and Indemnity Co.,44 was again concerned
with a certificate of insurance. The defendant issued a policy
of liability insurance to Willie Lee Hemingway on August 20,
1963, under the South Carolina Assigned Risk Plan to remain in
effect for a period of one year, expiring on August 20, 1964. On
April 30, 1964, Security certified its coverage of Hemingway
under the policy giving its termination date. Some time prior to
August 20, 1964, the defendant notified Hemingway that his
coverage would terminate on August 20 unless renewed by
August 5. The renewal premium was not paid, and on August
30, 1964, Hemingway was involved in an automobile accident
with Norman Turbeville. Turbeville was later awarded a verdict
for the injuries and damages sustained as result of this accident.
Security denied liability for the judgment relying on Heming-
way's failure to renew his policy and the subsequent termination
of coverage prior to the date of the accident.
43. 249 S.C. 89, 95, 152 S.E2d 727, 730 (1967).
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On the date of the accident Turbeville had in effect a policy
of insurance with United States Fidelity and Guarantee Com-
pany containing the statutory uninsured motorist coverage. This
company, as plaintiff, commenced this action to impose liability
on Security in accordance with 1962 South Carolina Code sec-
tion 46-702(7) (h), which provides in pertinent part,
When an insurance carrier has certified a motor vehicle
liability policy under § 46-748 or § 46-749, the insurance so
certified shall not be cancelled or terminated until at least
ten days after a notice of cancellation or termination of the
insurance certified shall be filed with the department ....
The plaintiff contended that the defendant company's coverage
could not have been terminated without submitting the requisite
notice to the Highway Department.
The court accepted this construction of the statutory provision,
finding that the intention of the legislature was to guarantee
continuous coverage of the insured, and that, to this end, the
duty devolved on the insurer to give notice before the termina-
tion or cancellation of a previously certified policy. To the
defendant's assertion that this provision should be so construed
with respect to cancellation but not to orderly termination of
insurance coverage, the court responded, "The danger to the
public from the absence of liability coverage is no greater when
it results from one cause than from the other. The statutory
purpose was to protect from both."45 ,
The obvious effect of this decision was to impose upon all
insurance companies the burden of submitting the requisite
notice of cancellation or termination of all liability insurance
coverage previously certified. Failure to do so necessarily ex-
tends the coverage until such time as notice -is received by the
Highway Department regardless of whether the insured has
paid premiums for additional coverage.
The case of Security General Insurance Company v. Bill Ver-
non Chevrolet, Ino.46 concerned an action for a declaratory judg-
ment arising out of a somewhat unusual and complex fact situa-
tion and involving an apparent conflict between previously ren-
dered federal and state supreme court decisions. The facts as
stipulated by the parties and found by the court are as follows:
R. J. Sharpton owned an automobile which he sold to Bill Ver-
45. Id. at 314, 149 S.E2d at 650.
46. 263 F. Supp. 74 (D.S.C. 1967).
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non Chevrolet; Bill Vernon sold this vehicle to Wilbur C. Hair
on March 29, 1966, but the title, never having been transferred,
remained in R. J. Sharpton; Hair never registered the vehicle
with the highway department of any state but operated it with-
out the benefit of any liability insurance protection; on April
18, 1966, as the result of negligence on the part of Hair, the
vehicle was involved in a collision with a second vehicle operated
by. Chester L. Anderson; an- action was instituted against Hair
by Anderson to recover for damiages occasioned by the collision;
on April 18, 1966, Anderson was protected under a policy of
liability insurance issued by the plaintiff, and Bill Vernon was
the holder of a policy of liability insurance issued it by Uni-
versal Underwriters.
The plaintiff, in an effort to avoid liability under the unin-
sured motorist provision4 7 of Anderson's-policy, sought to impose
financial responsibility for any judgment obtained by Anderson
against Hair upon the defendant, Universal Underwriters. The
plaintiff argued that as Vernon had had the vehicle in stock for
resale, without having it titled in its own name section 46-
150.1648 of the 1962 South Carolina Code placed an affirmative
obligation upon it to comply with the requirements of the law
upon sale'of the vehicle'by seeing that the new owner had liabil-
ity insurance protection or its equivalent. Going one step fur-
ther, *the plaintiff maintained that, for failure to comply with
this statutory provision, Bill Vernon became financially re-
sponsible.
Although this appears to be an unusual factual situation, it is
not the first time that our courts have been confronted with a
problem of this nature. A strikingly similar situation was pre-
sented in the case of Clouse v. American Autua LTiability Ins.r-
ance Company"t in which liability was imposed on a dealer's
insurance carrier, which occupied virtually the same position as
47. S.C. CoDE: AxN. §§ 46-750.32-.33 (1962).
48. If a dealer buys a vehicle and holds it for resale and procures the certifi-
cate of title from the owner within ten days after delivery to him of the
vehicle, he need not send the certificate to the Department, but, upon
transferring the vehicle to another person other than, by the creation of a
security interest, shall promptly execute the assignment and warranty
of title by a dealer, showing the names and addresses of the transferee
and of any lienholder holding a security interest created or reserved at
the time of the resale and the date of his security agreement, in the
spaces provided therefor on the certificate or as the Department pre-
scribes, and mail or deliver the certificate to the Department with the
transferee's application for a new certificate.
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did Universal Underwriters in the instant case. The court in
Clouse relied upon the dealer's failure to comply with what it
deemed to be the affirmative obligation placed upon it by the
South Carolina statute,50 thereby imposing upon its insurance
carrier financial responsibility for the judgment rendered in
favor of the plaintiff, who occupied the same position as did
Anderson in this suit.
The defendants here, however, took the position that Clouse
was an inaccurate interpretation of section 46-150.16; and in
support of this stand they relied upon the more recent South
Carolina case of Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company V.
Juian51 which, if truly inconsistent with Clouse, would have
vitiated it by virtue of the Erie doctrine. 52 In considering sec-
tion 46-150.15, 3 the court in Grain Dealers concluded that "title
to a motor vehicle passes to a purchaser notwithstanding the
want of compliance with the Title Certificate Law."54
There is a factual distinction between Clouse and Grain Deal-
ers in that there was no dealer or intermediary in the latter
case; but, in so far as the actual transfer of title is concerned,
the distinction seems to be more one of form than of substance.
Nevertheless, in deciding the instant case, the court considered
this distinction of such significance as to prevent Grain Dealers
from modifying or superceding Clouse and declared the above
quoted passage from Grain Dealers to be mere dictum. Accord-
ingly, the instant case was deemed governed by the decision ren-
dered in Clouse. In further support of its decision the court
referred to what it determined to be the state legislative policy
50. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 46-150.16 (1962).
51. 247 S.C. 89, 145 S.E.2d 685 (1965).
52. Erie LR. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
53. If an owner, manufacturer or dealer transfers his interest in a vehicle
other than by the creation of a security interest, he shall, at the time of
the delivery of the vehicle, execute an assignment and warranty of title
to transferee in the space provided therefor on the certificate or as the
Department prescribes and cause the certificate and assignment to be
mailed or delivered to the transferee or to the Department
Except as provided in § 46-150.16, the transferee shall, promptly after
delivery to him of the vehicle, execute the application for a new certifi-
cate of title in the space provided therefor on the certificate or as the
Department prescribes and cause the certificate and application to be
mailed or delivered to the Department.
Except as provided in § 46-150.16, and as between the parties, a trans-
fer by an owner is not effective until the provisions of this section have
complied with. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 46-150.15 (1962).
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of continuous liability coverage on a large number of secondhand
cars sold throughout the state.
At this juncture a careful study of the two legislative provi-
sions under consideration is in order. A close reading of these
sections will reveal that the only documents required to be filed
by the transferee under section 46-150.15 and the dealer-trans-
feror under section 46-150.16 are the endorsed certificate of title
from the former owner and the application for a new certificate
in the name of the purchaser. In neither section is there any
mention of a certificate of insurance or its equivalent which must
accompany these documents. As has been noted in an earlier
comment on the Clouse case, 55 this certificate of insurance need
only be produced for purposes of licensing and registration prior
to the operation of a motor vehicle on the highway. A person
desiring to purchase a motor vehicle for purposes other than
operation on the highways (i.e., display, racing, removal of
parts or, as is often the case with trucks and buses, for use as
living quarters) has no need for liability insurance nor is he
required by the laws of this state to obtain such coverage. Tak-
ing this decision literally, however, one who purchases a motor
vehicle for any purpose whatsoever can never become the lawful
owner until he has procured liability insurance. Moreover, the
court in deciding the instant case proclaimed section 46-150.16
"~a vital part of this State's scheme of insurance" 56 and declared
that any attempt by contract to avoid its provisions as inter-
preted would be contrary to public policy and consequently
invalid.
It seems that the federal court in this district has unwittingly
stepped into a quagmire of policy considerations in which it is
content to languish and from which it has as yet refused any
attempt at rescue by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
VI. CoN m nTiox BmEvwEu INsmms oF JOINT TonT-Fu.soRs
The case of Travelers Insurance Company v. Allstate Insur-
ance Company57 represents the only decision during the survey
period which was termed by at least one member of the court as
"one of novel impression." 8 Whether this is truly the case will
55. Kemmerlin, 1964-1965 Survey of S.C. Law of Insurance, 18 S.C.L. Rxv.
68, 78 (1966).
56. 263 F. Supp. at 79.
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be commented on in more detail in a subsequent issue of this
Review,"9 but the division of the court should be sufficient to
warrant close scrutiny of the decision by those persons affiliated
with the insurance industry.
Robert M. Gray was awarded a verdict against several named
defendants in an action to recover for injuries sustained in an
automobile accident allegedly occasioned by the combined negli-
gence of the defendants. Travelers Insurance Company was the
carrier for two of the defendants and, under threat of attach-
ment, was compelled to pay the entire judgment. Having done
so, it commenced this action to seek contribution from Allstate
as insurer of E. D. Bessinger, the driver of the automobile in
which Gray was a passenger and against whom a verdict was
rendered pursuant to the guest passenger statute,60 and against
Bessinger individually. The lower court sustained the demurrer
interposed by Bessinger and Allstate on the theory that "under
the law of this state one tort-feasor may not require contribution
from another tort-feasor where both are burdened with a com-
mon judgment growing out of a single collision."6 ' Travelers
appealed, arguing that its payment of the entire judgment re-
sulted in the unjust enrichment of the respondents, Bessinger
and Allstate, and that they should be made to contribute.
The majority determined at the outset that "each insurance
carrier is in the same legal position as its insured,"6 2 and that
Allstate was liable for no more than Bessinger, should he be
found liable at all. Once the position of the parties was so estab-
lished, the common law rule, as recently reiterated in this juris-
diction, 3 was invoked for the proposition that "there can be no
indemnity among mere joint tort-feasors." 64 The court then con-
cluded that
The debt to Gray as established in the original trial has been
paid on behalf of one joint tort-feasor and when that debt
was obliterated, the other joint tort-feasor was completely
released and, accordingly, he has not and cannot suffer a
59. (Recent decision to be published in next issue).
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-801 (1962).
61. No. 18669 (S.C., June 15, 1967).
62. Id.
63. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Whetstone, 243 S.C. 61, 132 S.E2d 172
(1963).
64. No. 18669 (S.C., June 15, 1967).
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loss and there is no debt existing for his own insurance car-
rier to pay."65
In response to Travelers' attempt to invoke an exception to
the common law rule the majority, while recognizing the exist-
ence of such an exception in other jurisdictions, observed that
our courts have, as yet, rejected any modification of the general
prohibition against indemnity among joint tort-feasors.
In dissenting, Justice Bussey, with whom Justice Brailsford
concurred, criticized the position adopted by the majority, argu-
ing that Travelers was not a tort-feasor and therefore not subject
to the principles governing contribution among joint tort-
feasors. In this regard he maintained that "[b]oth insurers
involved are bound not as tort-feasors, but as a result of the per-
fectly lawful contracts they issued. ... That Bessinger is a tort-
feasor is immaterial, since Travelers is not."66 For this reason
he denied the applicability of Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Company v. Whetstone, inferring that the majority had been
unable to differentiate between the theory of subrogation, in
which case Whetstone would be apposite, and that of contribu-
tion, in which case it would not. Accordingly, he opined that
Allstate should be compelled to bear its share of a common and
equal burden imposed upon it and Travelers by the original ver-
dict rendered against their respective insureds and that this
result was dictated by the principles of equity and natural jus-
tice upon which the law of contribution is founded.
VII. CONSTUCTION OF SPECIFIC PoLIcY LANGUAGE
Surveyed under this heading are those decisions turning on
the construction of single words or phrases included in the insur-
ance policy. As these cases defy any further categorical subdi-
sion, they will be discussed in an order which lends itself to
some degree of continuity, with each individual decision being
analyzed under its respective case name. Most of the decisions
are concerned with some isolated issue and do not warrant or
permit any historical development or generalization, and for
this reason the discussion of them will be confined to the narrow
issues involved. The survey does not purport to edify or in-
struct with respect to each particular area, but rather is intended
to bring these decisions to the attention of the Bar and to focus
65. Id.
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particular attention on those situations which justify such
treatment.
A. McAbee v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company
7
The plaintiff's deceased was struck and killed by a tractor he
had been towing as he attempted to disengage the tow chain
from the rear of the truck. The truck against which he was
crushed was covered by a policy of insurance issued by the de-
fendant, Nationwide, providing protection in the event of injury
sustained "while in or upon, entering or alighting from"68 the
vehicle. The question before the court was whether the term
'"upon" could be construed to cover this type of situation in
which the injured party was actually standing on the ground
though maintaining physical contact with the vehicle.
The supreme court, noting the lack of authority in this juris-
diction and the diversity of opinion from others, adopted what
it considered "a broad and liberal construction in favor of the
insured" 9 requiring only "actual physical contact" 70 with the
insured vehicle to establish that the insured was upon the vehicle.
A careful consideration of the other quoted terms-in, entering
or alighting from, - indicates that this is the only plausible
construction to be given to the additional term "upon"; for as
stated elsewhere, "It cannot mean that the insured, to be within
the meaning of the clause, had to be couched on the roof of the
car or on the running board or sitting on the hood. It must
connote some physical relationship between himself and the car
that enlarged the area defined by the words 'entering or alight-
ing' and the word 'in."1
B. Able v. Travelers Insurance Company72
This action was commenced to recover benefits allegedly due
on a policy of insurance issued by the defendant company to the
plaintiff's husband, Lawrence M. Able, insuring against "loss
resulting directly and independently of all other causes from
accidental bodily injuries" 73 sustained during the term of the
67. 249 S.C. 96, 152 S.E.2d 731 (1967). For a more detailed analysis of this
decision see 19 S.C.L. REv. 483 (1967).
68. 249 S.C. at 98, 152 S.E2d at 731 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 99, 152 S.E.2d at 732.
70. Id.
71. Wolf v. American Cas. Co., 2 Ill. App. 124, 118 N.E.2d 777, 780 (1954).
72. 248 S.C. 101, 149 S.E.2d 262 (1966).
73. Id. at 103, 149 S.E.2d at 262.
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policy but specifically excluding "any loss caused or contributed
to by disease.1 74 Travelers admitted the existence of the policy
but denied liability, relying upon the specific exclusion.
The evidence revealed that the insured was a policeman, ap-
proximately sixty-two years of age, with a history of high blood
pressure or hypertension, for which he had been receiving treat-
ment. During the evening of December 8, 1963, the insured was
attempting to effect an arrest when the suspect broke and ran;
the insured pursued him on foot for some distance before falling
and injuring his hands. Able then proceeded home and aroused
his wife who subsequently testified as to his then visible nervous
condition which prompted her to take him to the office of the
family physician, Dr. Raysor. He was put in the hospital where
he died the following morning.
The trial produced a verdict for the defendant from which the
plaintiff appealed on the contention that there was a lack of
evidentary support of the defense of non-coverage. The court,
in affirming, called attention to the testimony of Dr. Raysor to
the effect that the exertion and injuries sustained in the at-
tempted arrest merely combined with the insured's pre-existing
physical condition to cause his death, and that the basic cause of
death was hypertension. The court considered this testimony in
light of the phrase "directly and independently of all other
causes" and concluded that the policy provision involved was
sufficient to exclude liability.
C. Cooper v. John Hancock Mutual Life I suranae Co. 75
Albert S. Cooper incurred hospital and surgical expenses in
the treatment of an inguinal hernia for which he sought to
recover from the defendant insurance company with which he
had a policy of insurance providing for hospital and surgical
operation benefits. The policy in question extended coverage to
"(1) an accidental bodily injury which does not arise out of and
in the course of employment, or (2) disease for which the em-
ployee is not entitled to a benefit under any Workmen's Com-
pensation Law or Act."
76
The plaintiff alleged that the hernia was neither an accidental
injury arising out of and in the course of his employment nor a
74. Id.
75. 248 S.C. 534, 151 S.E.2d 668 (1966).
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disease for which he was entitled to benefits under the Work-
men's Compensation Law. The insurer denied these allegations
contending that the hernia was an accidental injury arising out
of and in the course of Cooper's employment.
Cooper had previously filed for and been denied benefits
under the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Law, the
South Carolina Industrial Commission ruling that he "did not
receive an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
his employment within the meaning of the terms and provisions
of the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act.' 7 There
was also uncontradicted expert testimony presented in the trial
of this cause to the effect that Cooper's hernia was "a disease
within the meaning of the terms of the policy here involved'7
8
so as to entitle him to benefits.
The defendant appealed from this determination that the
hernia was not caused by any single happening or event. The
supreme court concluded, however, that the hernia was in fact
a disease, thus obviating the necessity of determining its cause,
and that since no benefits were forthcoming under the Work-
men's Compensation Law, Cooper was entitled to the benefits
set out in the policy issued by the defendant insurer.
D. Harper v. Banker's Life and Casualty (0. 7
9
The insured, Mrs. Samuel D. Harper, after having been
released from a Florence, South Carolina, hospital to which she
had been admitted for surgery and subsequent treatment of
cancer, continued to take medicine and drugs prescribed by the
attending physician and procured by her from drug stores in the
area. During this period she had in full force and effeci a policy
of insurance issued by the defendant insurance company whereby
it agreed to pay certain medical expenses including:
1. HOSPITAL cAiE--HospitaZ board and room, and miscel-
Zaneous hospital expenses, while hospital-confined or as an
out-patient; including drugs, medicines .... 
8 0
The defendant paid the claims for all expenses except that for
drugs incurred after the insured's discharge from the hospital.
In this regard Banker's challenged the insured's qualification as
77. Id. at 536, 151 S.E.2d at 668-69.
78. Id. at 538, 151 S.E.2d at 669.
79. 248 S.C. 468, 151 S.E.2d 98 (1966).
80. Id. at 470, 151 S.E.2d at 99.
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an out-patient, relying upon the stipulated fact that "in the
Florence area the only patients that are designated as out-
patients by the hospital are those who are treated in the emer-
gency clinic and never admitted to the hospital."8' The lower
court found for the plaintiff, ordering the insurer to pay the cost
of all drugs and medicines necessarily and actually used in the
treatment of the insured for a covered disease.
The supreme court rejected this position in ruling that
"[e]very patient who has been discharged from a hospital is not
necessarily an out-patient of the hospital simply because his
condition requires further treatment. 82 It went on to note that,
in light of the stipulated facts, the insured in this situation did
not qualify as an out-patient and was, therefore, not entitled to
recover for expenses incurred in the procurement of drugs and
medicines subsequent to her discharge from the hospital.
E. Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company v. Nationwide Mu-
tua Insurance Company
88
Waymon R. Hairston was insured under a policy of liability
insurance issued by the plaintiff. This policy was in full force
and effect on March 28, 1965, when Hairston was involved in an
accident while operating, without permission, an automobile
owned by the parents of a friend. This action was for a declara-
tory judgment absolving the plaintiff of any liability for such
recovery as might subsequently be rendered against Hairston as
result of injuries or damages sustained by other parties involved
in the accident. Although not so indicated in the reported deci-
sion, apparently Nationwide had issued a policy containing the
requisite uninsured motorist coverage to one or more of the
injured parties.
In denying liability Harleysville relied upon a unique inter-
pretation of a policy provision which must be set out in full to
be appreciated:
Persons Insured. The following are insureds under Part 1:
(a) With respect to the owned automobile,
(1) the named insured and any resident of the same household,
(2) any other person using such automobile, provided the actual use thereof Is
with the permission of the named insured;
(b) With respect to a non-owned automobile,
(1) the named insured,
81. Id. at 471, 151 S.E2d at 100.
82. Id.
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(2) any relative, but only with respect to a private passenger automobile or trailer,
provided the actual use thereof is with the permission of the owner;
(c) Any other person or organization legally responsible for the use of
(1) an owned automobile, or
(2) a non-owned automobile, if such automobile is not owned or hired by such
person or organization,
provided the actual use thereof is by a person who is an insured under (a) or (b)
above with respect to such owned automobile or non-owned automobile.84
The plaintiff's contention was that the permissive use proviso
of part (b) beginning with the word "provided" should apply
to parts (b) (1) as well as (b) (2) because it begins, not on the
same margin as the word "any" above it, but all the way out to
the margin at the beginning of (b) under the word "with".
Thus, it argued that Hairston was not insured since he was
operating the vehicle without permission of its owner.
The court considered this contention, conceding the validity of
the argument when the quoted provision was scrutinized out of
context with particular attention being focused on the margin
in question. It concluded, however, "the device, in context,
was inadequate for this purpose. In the printed policy, the
location of the word 'provided' on the margin is so inconspicu-
ous as to escape the attention of any save the most diligent and
observant. 8 r0 Decisions interpreting similar policy provisions
differently were considered by the court, but it was pointed out
that in each of these situations the spacing emphasized the use
of the device, thereby rendering it conspicuous, in sharp con-
trast to the printed material in this policy.
F. Patterson v. Aetna Life Inuranee Company8
The plaintiff's son, a cerebral palsy victim as the result of
natal injuries, was insured under a group health insurance
policy. The child was a patient at the Asheville Orthopedic
Hospital, Inc., Asheville, North Carolina, for a period of more
than one year. During this time he received physical therapy,
occupational therapy, and speech therapy. The plaintiff, having
personally borne the expenses of this treatment, sought reim-
bursement from the insurer. The defendant denied liability for
these expenses challenging the qualifications of Asheville Ortho-
pedic as a "hospital" within the following policy provisions:
84. Id. at 400-01, 150 S.E2d at 234.
85. Id. at 401-02, 150 S.E.2d at 234.
86. 248 S.C. 374, 149 S.E.2d 915 (1966).
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The term "hospital" means only an institution which meets
fully every one of the following tests, namely, (a) it is pri-
marily engaged in providing-for compensation from its
patients and on an inpatient basis--diagnostic and thera-
peutic facilities for the surgical and medical diagnosis,
treatment, and care of injured and sick persons by or under
the supervision of a staff of physicians, and (b) it con-
tinuously provides twenty-four hour a day nursing service
by registered graduate nurses, and (c) is not, other than
incidentally, a place for rest, a place for the aged, a place
for drug addicts, a place for alcoholics, or a nursing home.
8 7
This contest was grounded solely on the failure of Asheville
Orthopedic to provide surgical facilities. The court concluded
that the hospital in question possessed no surgical or operating
facilities nor did it have any contractual relationship with a
neighboring institution enabling it to share the latter's facilities.
These factors were considered in light of the following test:
[In order to qualify, an institution must be primarily en-
gaged in providing facilities for surgical and medical treat-
ment of injured and sick persons under the supervision of
a staff of physicians.8 8
This decision gave rise to the determination that "to provide
facilities for medical treatment, but none for surgery, is to meet
the test only in part, which is insufficient for qualification as a
hospital under the explicit language of the contract.
' 's 9
Thus, the court resolved this issue by ruling that the language
of the policy clearly and unambiguously excluded protection in
this instance.
G. utual Savings 6 Loan Association v. Monarch Insurance
Company9"
In 1953 Louise Easterling executed a mortgage on a dwelling
to the plaintiff, Mutual Savings & Loan Association at which
time she procured a policy of fire insurance from the defendant,
naming the mortgagee-plaintiff beneficiary. This policy con-
tained the following provisions:
87. Id. at 376, 149 S.E.2d at 916 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 377, 149 S.E2d at 917.
89. Id.
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Provided also, that the mortgagee (or trustee) shall notify
this Company of any change of ownership or occupancy or
increase of hazard, which shall come to the knowledge of
said mortgagee (or trustee) and, unless permitted by this
policy, it shall be noted thereon, and the mortgagee (or
trustee) shall, on demand, pay the premium for such in-
creased hazard for the term of the use thereof; otherwise
this policy shall be null and void.9 1
In March 1956 Louise Easterling transferred title to the
mortgaged property to her husband, Richard, and in 1957 the
insurance policy was renewed. When the dwelling in question
was destroyed by fire in July of 1961, a demand was made on
the insurer for payment pursuant to the policy provisions. The
defendant denied liability, asserting that the policy had been
violated by the failure of the plaintiff to notify it of the change
of ownership of the insured property, thus rendering the policy
null and void. In addition, it alleged the existence of a second
policy of fire insurance procured by Richard Easterling in May
1961 from Underwriters Insurance Company, maintaining, in
the alternative, that if Monarch be found liable, its liability
should not exceed that portion of the loss that its coverage bore
to the total coverage under both policies.
The plaintiff, in response to these allegations, denied any
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the change of own-
ership of the insured property and also denied the existence of
the second policy purported to have been issued by Underwrit-
ers. Upon reference to a Master, these conflicts were resolved
in favor of the plaintiff; and from this determination and its
subsequent affirmation by the trial court the defendant appealed.
On appeal the Master's findings were allowed to stand, with
the court observing that even if the plaintiff could be charged
with knowledge of the change of ownership, the
failure of a mortgagee-beneficiary to notify the insurer of
a change of ownership of the mortgaged property, of which
the mortgagee has knowledge, does not forfeit the mort-
gagee's rights under the policy unless the change of owner-
ship is such as to increase the risk, as to which there was no
showing before the Master, or unless the policy provides
91. Id. at 277, 149 S.E2d at 635.
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that a change in ownership will render it void, which the
policy in issue did not provide .... 92
This conclusion was apparently dictated by the court's determi-
nation that
The obvious purpose of the required notification is to enable
the insurer to determine whether the transfer has increased
the hazard, and if so, to demand that the mortgagee pay
the higher premium called for by the increased hazard, on
pain of having the policy declared void.
93
H. Dean . Amercan Fire & Casualty Co.94
American Fire & Casualty issued its policy of insurance to
John Dean on November 5, 1965, providing for payment of
medical expenses incurred in the treatment of injuries occa-
sioned when "st'uck by an automobile."9 5 On June 1, 1965,
Dean sustained injury to his finger while attempting to remove a
jack from under his automobile. The vehicle fell on the jack and
crushed Dean's finger. This injury necessitated the amputation
of the finger for which Dean incurred relatively minor medical
expenses. In his action to recover these expenses from the in-
surer, the lower court ruled that the term "through being struck
by an automobile" should be construed to cover only those situa-
tions in which the insured, as a pedestrian, was struck by an
"automobile in movement and propulsion."9 6
The supreme court concluded that to affirm the decision of
the lower court would be to interpolate into the policy language
an additional stipulation not contemplated by the parties to the
contract:
The provision of the policy here contains no limitation or
condition as to how or in what manner an insured must be
"struck by an automobile" in order for coverage to be
effective. The word "struck" is the past tense of the word
"strike" which in its plain, ordinary and popular sense
means "to hit with some force"; "to come in collision with";
"to give a blow to"; "to come in contact forcibly"....
92. Id. at 280, 149 S.E2d at 637.
93. Id. at 281, 149 S.E.2d at 637.
94. 249 S.C. 39, 152 S.E2d 247 (1967).
95. Id. at 40, 152 S.E.2d 248 (emphasis added).
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Here, the falling automobile was the causative force bring-
ing about the appellant's injury. To hold that the appellant
was not struck by an automobile would require us to deviate
from the plain, ordinary and popular meaning of the words
used in the insurance contract.
9 7
I. 8t. Paul Mercury Insurance Company v. Pennsylvania Lum-
bermen's Mutual Inurance Company
98
This was an action for a declaratory judgment to determine
the ownership of a Chevrolet automobile. The facts were that:
in 1963 Varndell Gallardo, a minor whose driver's license had
been suspended, desired to purchase the Chevrolet; the vehicle
was purchased in the name of Eusebio Gallardo, Varndell's
father, under an installment contract with the installments being
paid by both Varndell and Eusebio; Varndell paid the High-
way Department registration fee and a twenty dollar uninsured
motorist fee; the Gallardo family regarded the automobile as
belonging to Varndell but considered Mrs. Gallardo, Varndell's
mother, as the principal user; at the time the automobile was
purchased Eusebio had a family combination policy with Lum-
bermen's which contained an automatic insurance clause which
purported to cover any "private passenger, farm or utility auto-
mobile ownership of which is acquired by the named insured
during the policy period.199
On January 31, 1964, while being driven by Varndell, the
automobile in question crashed into a tree causing bodily injury
to Andrew Cam and John Delano Garcia resulting in Garcia's
subsequent death. At the time of the accident Cam was insured
by St. Paul Mercury with its attendant uninsured motorist pro-
tection, and Garcia was insured by State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Insurance Company. Both Cam and Garcia's administra-
tor[s] filed suit against their respective insurance carriers under
the uninsured motorist provision of their policies. St. Paul, when
notified of the claims against Vamndell, denied coverage and
declined defense.
The court determined at the outset that Pennsylvania Lum-
bermen's protection would extend to the vehicle in question if
97. Id. at 41-2, 152 S.E.2d at 248-49.
98. 257 F. Supp. 483 (D.S.C. 1966).
99. Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
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owned by Eusebio Gallardo but not if owned by Varndell.100 A
review of the applicable South Carolina law indicated a prima
facie rebuttable presumption of ownership in favor of the indi-
vidual whose name appears on the certificate of title. The court
resolved the factual issue by declaring Eusebio the owner of the
automobile. Those elements apparently considered in reaching
this conclusion include: (1) the certificate of title and registra-
tion bore the name of Eusebio; (2) Mrs. Gallardo was the
principal operator of the vehicle and assumed the responsibility
for making inquiries as to insurance coverage; (3) Eusebio was
primarily obligated to and actually did make many of the in-
stallment payments and was also responsible for payment of
property taxes on the automobile. Thus, the presumption was
sustained on the evidence with little real indication being given
as to just which factors were accorded the greatest weight or
what additional elements might be determinative in future cases
in the absence of one or more of those present here.
Although the court settled the question of ownership against
the plaintiff, it proceeded to relieve it of any liability by con-
cluding that Mrs. Gallardo had expressly rejected the coverage
available under the automatic insurance clause. "The fact that
the acquired automobile is insured automatically for the notice
period does not mean that one cannot refuse the coverage at an
earlier time because he does not wish to pay for it."101
J. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Fleming102
Henry C. Fleming, Jr. owned a 1963 Ford truck which was
covered by a one year policy of liability insurance issued by
Nationwide on October 16, 1964. The policy contained an auto-
matic insurance clause extending immediate coverage to all
newly acquired additional vehicles provided the insurer be noti-
fied of such acquisition within a period of thirty days there-
100. It may be that the necessity for this determination of the ownership of
the automobile could have been obviated had the plaintiff chosen to rely upon
the earlier South Carolina case of Pacific Insrance Company v. Fireman's
Fund Insurance Company, 247 S.C. 282, 147 S.E.2d 273 (1966). When given its
most literal construction, that case appears to apply South Carolina Code Sec-
tions 46-750.31 and 46-750.32 to an automobile liability insurance policy of this
type so as to extend its coverage to the insured, his spouse, "and all members
of the household, whether related or not, and while driving an automobile,
regardless of who owns it!" Brief for Appellant at 7, Pacific Ins. Co. v. Fire-
man's Fund Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 283, 147 S.E2d 273 (1966) (emphasis added).
101. 257 F. Supp. 483, 487-88 (D.S.C. 1966).
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after. Under the terms of the policy the same coverage would
be extended to any replaoement automobile whether or not the
insurer was notified of the acquisition. At the time the policy
was issued, Mr. Fleming also had a 1954 Pontiac which was
inoperable and upon which there was no insurance protection.
On March 16, 1964, Mr. Fleming traded the 1954 Pontiac as
down payment on a 1960 Pontiac. Upon purchase Fleming filled
out and submitted to the South Carolina Highway Department
a certificate of insurance form number 402 certifying that the
1960 Pontiac was covered by Nationwide, specifying the effec-
tive date of protection as October 16, 1963. A photostatic copy
of this certificate was forwarded by the Highway Department
to Nationwide for certification on May 14, 1964. Thereafter,
some time in May of 1964, the 1962 Ford truck was repossessed.
On August 30, 1964, Fleming was operating his 1960 Pontiac
when it collided with a vehicle, killing its driver Mr. White.
Actions were filed against Fleming on behalf of the estate of
Mr. White and the injured White children. Nationwide denied
coverage of the 1960 Pontiac and brought this action seeking a
declaratory judgment absolving it of any liability Fleming
might incur. The theory under which Nationwide proceeded
was as follows: (1) the 1960 Pontiac could not be considered
as a replacement for the 1963 Ford truck because of the lapse
of time between the acquisition of the former and the disposal of
the latter and (2) coverage was never extended to the 1960
Pontiac as an additional automobile because the requisite notice
of its acquisition was never received within the specified thirty
day period.
In considering Nationwide's first contention the court was
faced with an apparent lack of South Carolina authority. This
necessitated a review of general law and decisions from other
jurisdictions. The conclusion, based on a careful and detailed
study of these authorities, was that the Pontiac did not qualify
as a replacement because the Ford truck "was both serviceable
and undisposed of at the time of the delivery of the alleged
replacement."103 Although this determination appeared on its
face to be in conflict with or at least inconsistent with one
earlier decision,10 4 the two cases are clearly distinguishable;
and the conclusion is justified if not dictated by the law and
evidence presented.
103. Id. at 267.
104. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mast, 52 Del. 127, 153 A.2d 893 (1959).
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With regard to Nationwide's second contention, Fleming
asserted that the filing of the certificate of insurance with the
Highway Department should constitute notice to the insurer of
the acquisition of the Pontiac. This being the only argument
presented by Fleming, the court dispatched it by declaring that
"filling out a required form for the highway department does
not equate with informing the insurer they are committed to
provide additional protection."'1 5 Having so concluded, the
necessity for further consideration was obviated by the recent
South Carolina decision of Miller ,v. .Sturvesant Imurance Com-
pany.10 6 There the court adopted the general proposition that
It is well established that where the "automatic insurance"
clause requires notice of the acquisition of a new automobile
to be given the insurer within a specified time after deliv-
ery, the period generally being either ten or thirty days, a
failure to give notice prior to an accident occurring after
the expiration of the designated period precludes coverage
of the new automobile. 1
07
K. Seaboard Fire & Marine Imsurance Company v. Gibbs'
08
In November of 1962 Seaboard issued its policy of automobile
liability insurance to Daniel Gibbs, thereby agreeing to provide
protection on his 1951 Dodge pickup truck. The policy also pro-
vided coverage for any non-owned automobile while being driven
by Gibbs provided it was not "used in any other business or
occupation, except a private passenger automobile operated by
the named insured"'1 9 and provided the vehicle was an "auto-
mobile not owned by or furnished or available for the regular
use"" 0 of the insured. An automobile was specifically defined
as "a four wheel land and motor vehicle designed for use princi-
pally upon public roads.""'
Seaboard refused to defend Gibbs in a suit following an acci-
dent in which Gibbs was driving a six wheel truck owned by
his employer and furnished as transportation for Gibbs and
105. 257 F. Supp. at 267.
106. 242 S.C. 322, 130 S.E.2d 913 (1963).
107. Id. at 327, 130 S.E2d at 916.
108. 265 F. Supp. 623 (D.S.C. 1967).
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others. Seaboard's refusal was based on three grounds: (1) the
six wheel truck was not encompassed in the policy definition
of "automobile"; (2) that the truck was excluded from coverage
as a non-owned vehicle "furnished or available for his regular
use"; (3) the accident occurred while the truck was being used
as other than a "private passenger automobile operated or occu-
pied by the named insured."
Accordingly, the insurer commenced this action for a declara-
tory judgment absolving it of liability for any verdict that
might be rendered against Gibbs for injuries or damages arising
out of the accident.
In ruling on the plaintiff's first contention the court was
compelled by the lack of authority in this jurisdiction to resort
to decisions from other jurisdictions from which it concluded
that
Under [the] functional view of what is an "automobile"
under the terms of the policy, the fact that the vehicle in-
volved had six wheels on two axles, rather than the four-
wheel truck on which the policy was written, cannot alone
be controlling under the law of insurance.1 2
This issue resolved, foreign authority was again utilized by
the court in supporting its holding that the language, "furnished
or available for the regular use" of the insured, referred to the
furnishing of a vehicle for his continuous, regular and personal
use without his having to secure permission from the owner.
Since permission to use the truck was granted to Gibbs only on
a day-to-day basis and for specific purposes, the policy provi-
sion was not enough to preclude protection in this instance.
The plaintiff's third contention was premised on the use of
the truck in transporting permanently employed farm laborers
to and from work. These individuals were picked up and deliv-
ered on the route usually traveled by Gibbs, and, consequently,
the transportation was determined to be a mere gratuity ren-
dered them by Gibbs without compensation from his employers.
Accordingly, this activity was found to be a mere incident to
Gibbs' casual use of the truck and did not constitute an activity
in the pursuit of his business or profession.
112. Id. at 628.
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Although the case of Lee v. Gdf Insurance Company'1 3 is
more closely related to the substantive law of evidence, it ap-
pears to be of particular significance to those concerned with
the practice of insurance law.
The plaintiff, Lee, had previously obtained a judgment
against one Kirby Dix, the defendant's insured, in an action
predicated on the negligence of Dix in the operation of his
automobile. Lee then instituted this action to recover that
judgment alleging the existence of a liability insurance policy
issued by the defendant with Dix as the named insured.
The defendant admitted the existence of the insurance policy
but denied liability. In support of its contention of no liability,
Gulf sought to introduce into evidence the signed statement of
Dix which had been previously obtained by one of its adjusters.
When the statement was excluded as hearsay, Gulf attempted to
elicit from the adjuster certain statements alleged to have been
made to him by Dix. These were also excluded as hearsay. It is
from these rulings that Gulf appealed. The whole question was
whether or not the exclusion of this evidence by the trial judge
constituted error.
The defendant adopted the position that this evidence would
have been admissible had Dix been the plaintiff, and that since
Lee "stepped into the shoes of" the insured, he is thereby ren-
dered subject to all disabilities and rights accruing to the in-
sured. As the court put it, the insurer's basic contention was
that "the same evidence would be rendered admissible regardless
of whether the suit be brought by the insured or the injured
party. 11
n 4
In resolving this issue, the court used the general South
Carolina rule:
[Ain injured party who brings suit against a liability car-
rier in order to collect on a judgment previously acquired
against an insured is possessed of all rights of the insured
and subject to all defenses that exist between the insured
and the insurance carrier. Crook .v. State Far' MutuaZ
Automobile Insurance Company, 231 S.C. 257, 98 S.E.2d
427.115
113. 248 S.C. 296, 149 S.E2d 639 (1966).
114. Id. at 298, 149 S.E2d at 641.
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It went on, however, to reject the defendant's argument:
To say that the respondent had the same substantive rights
and is subject to the same defenses as the insured is not to
say that the ordinary rules governing the admissibility of
evidence should be modified or suspended in a trial adjudi-
cating these substantive rights and defenses." 6
Accordingly, the lower court ruling was affirmed, apparently
in reliance on the case of Columbia Casualty Company v.
Thomaa'1" in which a strikingly similar fact situation was
presented.
Ln-TwoOD S. EVANS, JR.
116. Id. at 298, 149 S.E2d at 641.
117. 101 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1939).
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